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Into the Void1
Governing Finance in Central & Eastern Europe
Katharina Pistor

Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the iron curtain, which for decades had separated
East from West, many countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are now
members of the European Union and some have even adopted the Euro. Their
readiness to open their borders to foreign capital and their faith in the viability of
market self-governance as well as supra-national governance of finance is both
remarkable and almost unprecedented. The eagerness of the countries in CEE to
join the West and to become part of a regional and global regime as a way of
escaping their closeted socialist past has both benefited and harmed them. There
is little doubt that joining the EU and opening to the rest of the world has helped
transform these economies at a pace that otherwise would have been
unthinkable. Yet, as the global financial crisis reveals, these countries have also
remained exceptionally vulnerable to shocks, including those that originate
beyond their sphere of influence. This paper looks for explanations in the
governance of finance, i.e. the allocation of de jure and de facto responsibilities
over financial systems. It argues that as recipient countries of massive capital
inflows CEE countries have largely relinquished policy tools to protect their
economies and societies against a financial melt down or to respond effectively
in a crisis. The policy choices they made – opening their boarders to capital
inflows, limiting regulatory oversight by relying on home country regulators of
foreign banks, etc. -- were aimed at integrating them into the European and the
global financial systems. A frequently overlooked side effect of these policies’
cumulative effect has been that they find themselves once more on the periphery
-- dependent on the goodwill of multilateral organizations over which they have
little sway. The paper discusses two strategies to improve the governance of
finance in CEE: A European regulator and the assertion of effect-based
regulatory jurisdiction over foreign bank activities.
Key words: Banking regulation; regulatory jurisdiction; global governance
JEL classification: G01, G15, G18, K20, O16
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I.

Introduction

A functioning market-based economy depends on a well working financial
system, i.e. on organizations that intermediate between savings and investments
and allocate resources, as well as on institutional arrangements that mitigate the
risk of collapse associated with complex financial systems. The former socialist
countries possessed certain elements of a financial system, such as savings banks
and organizations used by the government to store and to channel money.
However, intermediation and allocation functions were centrally controlled, i.e.
they were part of the state budget, and not independent decision by autonomous
actors. This arrangement was consistent with the organizational features of a
centrally planned economy, but it was unsuitable for de-centralized economies
that relied increasingly on market mechanisms. For such economies to work, a
new set of arrangements had to be found that allowed for greater dispersion of
financial services combined with effective checks and balances to guard against
the risk of systemic failure.
The story of the transformation of the financial sector in CEE from plan to
market has been often told (Rostowski 1995; Buch 1996; Tihanyi and Hegarty
2007) and will not be recounted here. Nonetheless, recalling how finance was
organized under socialism illustrates that the operation of financial systems is
closely intertwined with the organization of the economies and the prevailing
governance regime. The organization of finance takes one form under one, and
quite a different form under a different regime. Market economies are commonly
distinguished by the organization of their financial systems, i.e. whether they are
predominantly market-based or bank-based (Mayer 1998; Allen and Gale 2001).
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Both systems have their distinct institutional arrangements designed to address
the specific vulnerabilities inherent in them. Market-based systems are prone to
stock-market bubbles that may result in a crash. Bank-based systems have a high
probability of suffering from the cyclical nature of credit booms and busts. Most
economies have both stock markets and banks (Levine 2003) and can become
vulnerable to either shock.
The history of financial markets is a history of crises (Kindelberger 2005;
Minsky 1986); but it is equally a history of attempts to mend the institutional
arrangements that shall prevent them. What is often overlooked is that crisis
management itself is a critical part of the governance regime for financial
markets, and arguably the most important one. Once one recognizes that
financial markets are inherently instable,2 crisis management is an integral part
of the governance of finance. It shapes the future behavior of market participants
– a fact that is widely acknowledged in concerns about moral hazard associated
with government bailouts. More importantly, it reveals who is the ultimate
guardian of the financial system: Whoever has the resources to rescue a financial
system and sets the terms for the rescue deal. This role is typically denoted as
“lender of last resort”. In the context of the global crisis the role has morphed
into “investor of last resort” (sometimes also referred to as market maker or
“buyer of last resort”3) and even into the all-encompassing “whatever it takes”4 –
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Clearly, this has not been a core assumption of standard finance theory. See, however, Minsky
(1986); see also (Sornette 2004).
3
See Wilelm Buiter, “The Central Bank as Market Maker of Last Resort” available at
http://maverecon.blogspot.com/2007/08/central-bank-as-market-maker-of-last.html. As Buiter
points out, this is not simply a change in labels, but a response to changes in the market places,
i.e. that that markets have increasingly replaced banks as providers of credits.
4
Edmund L. Andrews, “Fed will do everything possible” to meet crisis, Bernanke says”, The
New York Times, 19 February 2009, available at www.nytimes.com.
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a commitment that is more appropriately labeled as “ultimate guardian”. Using
the guardian metaphor also emphasizes that crisis management is not about the
‘bail out’ of individual banks or other intermediaries, but an attempt to prevent a
collapse of the financial system. Theoretically it is conceivable that a private
organization (i.e. another powerful financial intermediary) assumes the role of
ultimate guardian; but the more typical candidates are domestic governments,
foreign governments (including more recently Sovereign Wealth Funds, see
(Pistor 2009)), or supranational organizations, such as the IMF, or some coalition
among them. The reason is that these agents are more likely to have access to the
resources needed for a large-scale rescue. They also tend to have broader social
objective functions than most private actors, enabling them to mobilize resources
for a ‘common good’.
The paper argues that the designation of the ultimate guardian is the result of
policy choices about the governance of finance. They include decisions about
liberalizing capital accounts, or not; building or not building reserves for ‘rainy
days’; pegging, floating, or managing the domestic currency; allowing foreign
bank ownership and/or dominance, or restricting it; and accepting or rejecting
the principle of home country regulator for foreign banks operating on one’s
territory. These decisions are not necessarily taken for the purpose of
outsourcing the function of the ultimate guardian. In fact, most taken by
countries in CEE were pre-determined by regional or global governance regimes
they joined. The combined effect of these policies, however, has disabled
governments in most CEE countries to protect their economies against a looming
crisis as evidenced by their ultimately unsuccessful attempts to control the credit
boom in the years leading up to the crisis; and once the crisis erupted with the
4

drying up of external finance, to effectively respond to it as their resources were
no match against the scale of private funds that had earlier flooded their
economies.
An argument could be made that these countries are ultimately better served
by outsourcing the governance of finance, including the role of the ultimate
guardian. There certainly are ample examples of countries outside Europe that
proved unable to protect themselves against major financial crises. Mexico’s
Tequilla crisis of 1994, the East Asian Financial crisis of 1997/98, and the crisis in
Argentina in 2001 serve as powerful examples. Although these countries were
not part of an evolving regional governance structure, the strategies they
pursued in their quest to join the global financial simple – namely financial
liberalization and financial deregulation -- resemble those of the countries in
CEE. The countries in CEE may have been motivated to proactively relinquish
governance over their financial systems in favor or a regional regime. The EU has
undertaken major efforts to Europeanize the governance of finance by
standardizing financial regulation and improving coordination among national
regulators (Corcoran and Hart 2002; Ferrarini 2002). It is in the interest of this
collective enterprise for countries to cede some of their sovereignty over finance.
Indeed, those countries that have joined the European Monetary Union have
relinquished their domestic currencies and control over monetary policies –
although they take part in the collective governance of the European Central
Bank (ECB) (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001). In addition, the policy advice given to
political leaders in the former socialist world about the benefits of financial
liberalization were motivated by a desire to protect their economies from undue
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political interference and thereby promote prosperity (Worldbank 1995, 1996;
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004).
Yet, there is a risk to this strategy; namely that supranational governance
regimes may be ineffective and/or serve ulterior interests; and the risk that in the
event of a crisis a country has to depend on ultimate guardians over whose
strategies and policy directions it has little control. In the context of the global
financial crisis many of these risks were realized in countries in CEE. This raises
important questions about the costs and benefits of the manner in which not only
countries in CEE, but other emerging markets as well, were advised to pursue
the process of integrating their economies into the global financial system.
The paper argues that the financial transformation in CEE countries has
created a governance void for individual countries and the region as a whole that
left them unable to control the risks associated with exposure to greater capital
flows. When their financial systems found themselves on the brink of collapse
this left them dependent on the IMF, the EBRD, and other multilaterals as
ultimate guardian. The causes for this void lie in policy decisions aimed at
integrating the CEE economies as fast and fully as possible into the European
and the global systems at a time when the governance regime for these supranational systems remained incomplete and tilted in favor of interests that – as
has become evident in the crisis -- were not fully aligned with the CEE countries’
welfare objectives.
The paper is organized as follows. Part II develops the concept of the ultimate
guardian and explains its role as an integral part to the governance and
operation of financial markets. It also identifies the ultimate guardian(s) of
finance for CEE countries based on the crisis experience. Part III uses the credit
6

boom that swept CEE economies in the years preceding the crisis to show that
extensive foreign ownership combined with governance regimes that effectively
outsourced governance of finance left domestic policy makers with few, if any,
effective tools to protect their economies against the risks associated with a credit
boom or respond effectively once the crisis had materialized. Part IV considers
governance options available to countries in the region. Part V concludes by
highlighting implications of this analysis for the governance interdependent
financial systems.

II.

The Role of Ultimate Guardian in the Governance of Finance

The operation of finance rests on the credibility of a promise for future
returns on an investment. The Encyclopedia Britannica defines ‘finance’ as “the
process of raising funds or capital for any kind of expenditure”,5 explaining that
some need more money today than they have on hand while others have excess
money that they can invest and thereby earn interests or dividends. One might
add that financial intermediation entails also the diversification of risk. The
willingness of those with excess money to realize gains from parting with their
money depends on the other party’s ability to invest productively and to commit
to pay out returns that have been generated. The regulatory regime for financial
markets is primarily concerned with ensuring that the promises made are indeed
credible. A range of legal and regulatory tools has been employed over time and
across countries to accomplish this task. They include, among others, legal

5

See www.britannica.com under “finance”.
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institutions, such as civil and criminal courts, for enforcing contractual and tort
claims; entry regulations for entities and persons wishing to offer financial
services; prudential requirements for financial intermediaries; agencies charged
with monitoring and supervising such intermediaries; and government
sponsored deposit insurances.
None of these tools, whether in isolation or in combination, has succeeded in
eliminating financial crises. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the
frequency, if not severity, of financial crises has increased in recent times
notwithstanding major improvements in the legal governance of financial
commitments (Bordo et al. 2001). A possible explanation is that every new legal
tool designed to contain risk invariably gives rise to strategies aimed at
circumventing it. Given the stakes involved, regulatory arbitrage is part of the
game. Thus, the legal governance of finance will always remain incomplete and
thus susceptible to failure (Pistor and Xu 2003). Even a perfect legal system could
not guard against wide spread default resulting from broadly shared
misjudgments about the future, not only because the future is difficult to predict,
but also because collective denial about the sustainability of certain patterns of
behavior are rampant, particularly in financial markets (Avgouleas 2009).
Perhaps even more importantly, the legal and regulatory tools listed above
only partly address the supply of money – the very medium of financial
transactions (Galbraith 1976 (2001)). A substantial change in the money supply -both increases and decreases -- can destabilize a financial system however well
designed laws and regulations might be. The sources of money supply are
multiple. They include the government’s “printing press” as well as other
monetary devices that might increase liquidity; the inflow of foreign capital; and
8

the money multiplier effect embedded in the credit system. The relevant policy
tools for governing the money supply include inflation targeting; the
management of foreign capital inflows through exchange rate policies, capital
controls and sterilization efforts; interest rate policies and changes in reserve
requirements, to affect the costs of lending by the private sector.
A comprehensive analysis of the governance of finance must therefore
include both the credibility as well as the supply sides of finance. It is all the
more important because the two are interdependent. Changes in the supply of
money can undermine the credibility of financial commitments. Inflation
undermines parties’ trust in the future value of money and increases incentives
for borrowers to defect (Wolf 1993). And as the subprime mortgage crisis
suggests, an increase in the supply of credits reduces lenders’ vigilance as they
seek to expand their market share in an increasingly competitive environment.
Once the credibility of financial promises is undermined – whether for reasons
associated with credibility or money supply -- and financial markets freeze up, a
financial system may collapse, bringing down with it the entire economy as has
happened during periods of hyperinflation (Germany in the aftermath of World
War I; or Zimbabwe in the 2000s) or in financial crashes following a asset booms
and busts associated with major credit expansion (as in the Great Depression in
the US, or in Argentina in 2001).
Every financial system is vulnerable to credibility problems as well as to
supply

shocks.

Available

empirical

evidence

confirms

that

financial

liberalization, which typically leads to greater inflow of capital, is positively
associated with subsequent financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). In the
past, the typical response has been to ensure that afflicted countries improve
9

their institutions. This was based on the assumption that financial markets
would operate efficiently as long as they could rely on effective institutions. In
response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, for example, the IMF
developed a comprehensive assessment program for the institutions governing
financial markets around the worlds – the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP).6 It uses ‘best practice standards’ drawn from the ‘most advanced’
financial systems, such as the US and the UK, to guide other countries in
reforming their legal and regulatory framework. In the current global financial
crisis, the appropriate response to the apparent governance failure appears to be
less obvious. After all, the crisis originated in the very countries that served as
best practice models and that were home to the very market participants whose
efficient operation had been assumed.
In fact, it is difficult to determine whether a financial crisis is related to bad
institutions, i.e. the credibility problem of finance, or excessive supply of capital
in search for high returns. Recognizing the latter as a problem is made more
difficult by the fact that capital inflows at first tend to have a positive effect on an
economy, spurring investment and growth. Thus, policy makers in CEE and
advisors at the IMF and elsewhere were very much aware of rapid credit
expansion in the region in the years leading up to the crisis, but could not decide
whether this was a good thing (a much desired catch up with the West) or a bad
thing (a credit boom that would eventually result in a bust). Ideological priors
further complicated a correct diagnosis of what was happening. Advocates of
market self-regulation tend to see the major problem of financial crisis not in

6

See http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp for details.
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behavior of market participants, but in an unwarranted and undesirable
‘external’ intervention concocted by politicians. If only politicians were able to
commit ex ante not to intervene in times of crisis, markets would effectively
regulate themselves, as market participants would fully internalize the costs of
their actions. This argument assumes that the root cause of financial crises can be
found in the credibility problem, i.e. the inability of private agents to credibly
commit only to those obligations they will be able to fulfill in the future. It
largely misses the money supply problem. While banks control part of the
money supply through the money multiplier effect associated with the credit
system, each bank can do so only for its own lending activities and has no control
over the system-wide implications the rapid expansion, to which it contributes
only as one among many. A bank that chose to cut back its own credit expansion
would undercut its ability to compete with others. As the former CEO of
Citigroup, Prince, famously quipped, they have little choice but to get up and
dance – until the music stops.
Given the indeterminacy of the ultimate causes of a financial crisis and given
that the financial system is indispensible for the operation of a market economy,
it is not surprising that most governments will try to protect their financial
system from collapse. However, individual governments may lack the resources
or the credibility to prevent a collapse. The actual ultimate guardian therefore is
not necessarily the domestic government, but whoever rescues a financial
system. The ultimate guardian may be one or more domestic agent (i.e. the
Central Banks and Treasury in case of the US rescue operations in the global
crisis); domestic agents in collaboration with their counterparts in other countries
(i.e. the Mexican and US governments in the case of the 1994 bail out of the
11

Mexican financial system); or multilateral agencies, such as the IMF, typically
upon the request by domestic governments (i.e. interventions in most countries
afflicted by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997/8 and a series of emerging
markets in the ongoing global crisis). Thus, the identity of the ultimate guardian
is often revealed only in a crisis. Yet, close inspection of a country’s governance
arrangements can help determine the viability (or lack thereof) of domestic
agents and thus establish whether ultimate guardianship has been effectively
outsourced.
When finance in CEE countries dried up as a result of the global financial
crisis, their governments turned out to be unable to protect their financial
systems, and ultimately their economies, without outside help. The ‘sudden stop’
of foreign capital inflows, in fact the extensive reversal of capital flows in 2008
and 2009,7 left their economies in free fall and brought their currencies under
attack. Luckily for them, help did come from various sides. As of the time of this
writing, the IMF had entered into emergency loans with Belarus, BosniaHerzegovina, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine and had concluded stand-by
agreements with Poland and Romania. The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) established a joint action program together with the
World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB) in January 2009,
committing €24.5 billion to support the banking sector in the region. The EBRD
has already invested €1 billion of these funds in Romania and additional funds
in Ukraine. The EBRD has also taken measures to stabilize individual banks; an
example is a $75 million loan granted to Raiffeisenbank Aval, the Ukrainian

7

Prisoska Nagy, “BIS Data on Cross-Border Flows – A Closer Look”, EBRD blog, 11 May 2009,
available at www. ebrdblog.com
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subsidiary of Raiffeisen International Austria. In addition, the European Union
has provided €50 billion for balance of payment support to countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. Finally, the European Central Bank (ECB) has entered into
and recently activated a swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sweden
(Sveriges Riksbank) to help it weather the storm of the financial crisis in the
Baltics (Sweden has not adopted the Euro). The ECB also announced cooperations with Narodowy Bank Polski (Poland) as well as Magya Nemzei Bank
(Hungary) to provide these countries, which had experienced extensive
‘euroization’ (Feige and Dean 2002) of their economies with euro liquidity. These
interventions benefited countries that received direct assistance, but also other
countries as these actions signaled that the financial systems of these countries
would not be allowed to implode. Still, the rescue operations were conducted in
an ad hoc fashion and depended on the perception of third parties (the IMF, the
EBRD, etc.) that assistance was warranted as well as their willingness and their
own endowment with sufficient resources, to step in. The uncertainty about the
identity of the ultimate guardian and its commitment to each of the afflicted
country is at the core of the governance void.

III.

Into the Void

The ability to perform the role of ultimate guardian for a financial system is
ultimately revealed in the context of a crisis. Yet, it is shaped by policy choices
that precede it. This section will review some of these choices and highlight how
they have affected the ability of countries in CEE to perform their role as ultimate
guardians to their own financial systems.
13

As has been pointed out in the previous section, an effective governance
regime for finance has to address both the credibility and money supply aspects
of finance, because credibility problems can affect the supply side, and vice
versa. Countries in CEE implemented extensive legal and regulatory reforms to
improve their financial systems and received guidance and support from the
EBRD (EBRD 1998; Fries, Neven, and Seabright 2002), the World Bank
(Worldbank 1996), and importantly the European Union, to this end. One of the
first major reform projects of the EBRD in the region was to improve the
conditions for the development of credit markets by reforming the regime for
collateralizing credit.8 Additionally, the accession process the EU required
countries in the region to adapt their laws and regulations to the European
standards. Lastly, all countries were regular clients of the IMF’s FSAP.9 Thus, not
only on paper but also in practice these countries have caught up with the
institutional standards widely regarded as critical for maintaining financial
stability. Against this background, the rapid expansion of credit most countries
since the late 1990s was regarded as a positive response to the institutional
reforms that had been implemented (Cottarelli, Dell'Ariccia, and VladkovaHollar 2005). Whereas as of 1998 most countries in CEE still lagged behind
countries at similar GDP levels in terms of the aggregate size of their credit
markets, they now reached, if not exceeded, these comparative benchmark data.10
What was remarkable was the speed with which these changes occurred. Within

8

A model law on secured transactions for the region was published as early as 1994. See
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.htm.
9
For
recent
FASP
reports
on
individual
countries,
see
http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp.
10
This has been the case in Bosnia-Hezegowina and Croatia. See Figure 2.6 in (Arcalean et al.
2007) at p. 22.
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a period of only 5 years (from 2000 to 2005) the credit to GDP ratio doubled or
even tripled in several countries (Enoch 2007). Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the
average annual credit growth in Bulgaria and the three Baltic states was twenty
percent and in Hungary, Romania and Croatia was over 10 percent. In Slovenia,
the average was around 10 percent. Only in Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia had credit growth been below 5 percent and at times even negative
(Arcalean et al. 2007). The credit growth persisted, and in some countries even
accelerated in the following years. According to Backe et al. (2007), “at the end of
2006, the annual growth rates of credit to the private sector ranged from 17% to
64% in the countries covered in this study”, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.11 These data almost certainly understate the real growth of credit, as
they exclude direct cross-border lending by foreign banks to firms and
households in these countries (see below). The persistent if not accelerating
credit growth occurred notwithstanding the fact that many countries actively
tried to reign in credit growth since the early 2000s. The means used varied from
country to country. Yet they shared a common fate: they proved largely
ineffective.
In principle, countries have a broad menu of choices to respond to excessive
credit expansion. Hilbers et al. (2007) have compiled a menu of such choices,
which includes macroeconomic policy measures to manage supply side of
money, including fiscal, monetary and exchange rate responses. It also lists
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In the United States, a country with a much larger and deeper financial system, credit extended
by commercial banks grew by about 11 percent in 2006. See Board of the Federal Reserves,
Monetary Report to Congress, 19 June 2006, at p. 22.
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prudential, supervisory and administrative measures, which address core
credibility issue.12 While some countries appear to have had temporary success
in at least slowing the rate of credit growth by employing some of these tools,
especially Poland, and to some extent Bulgaria, the subsequent renewed
expansion of credits suggest that ultimately these tools were not effective. This
can at least in part be explained with the accession of countries in CEE to the
European Union, which incurred in two waves. In 2004, the three Baltic states,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia joined the
EU; in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania followed suit. All countries experienced a
major post-accession boom, which has been attributed to increases in capital
flows.
With the accession to the EU the countries of CEE relinquished important
tools for governing their financial systems they previously had at their disposal.
The restrictions on policy choices imposed by EU law are plenty. With respect
the governance of money supply, most restrictions can be traced to the new
member states’ commitment to strive towards introducing the Euro. Specifically,
Articles 3 and 4 of the respective Accession Treaty entered into by each new
member state provides that it participates in the monetary union from the date of
accession. Yet, the adoption of the Europ has been delayed, as membership has

12

In addition, the menu includes two other items, namely ‘market development measures’ and
the ‘promotion of better understanding of risks’. The former includes legal institutions for
contract enforcement and improved accounting standards, i.e. institutions that fall broadly within
the category of credibility measures. Other ‘market development measures’ like hedging
instruments as well as ‘market based’ risk diversification instruments potentially have
implications for the credibility as well as the money supply sides of financial governance. These
items are not included in the review of policy tools available to CEE countries, because hedging
and derivative instruments did not play a major role in the credit boom in CEE. Neither shall the
policy response of “promotion of better understanding risks” be analyzed in detail as country
reports indicate that ‘moral suasion’ to tame the credit boom proved – perhaps not surprisingly –
ineffective. See the country reports in Enoch and Ötker-Robe (2005).
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been derogated in accordance with Art. 122 Maastricht Treaty until the relevant
convergence criteria have been met. These include fiscal restraint and the
reduction of government debt; price and interest rate stability; and exchange rate
stability. The European Central Bank monitors convergence and issues annual
convergence reports.13
Some policies associated with the convergence criteria work towards taming
a credit boom. Fiscal restraint is the most obvious one. The implications of
interest rate, price and exchange rate stability requirements are more ambivalent.
Hilbers et al. (2007) list greater exchange rate flexibility as an important tool for
controlling rapid credit expansion. Indeed, Poland seems to have been quite
successful in employing such strategies at times, but the ECB took note of this in
its convergence report (ECB 2008).14 Other countries had bound their hands by
pegging their exchange rates or using currency board arrangements that
committed them to tight exchange rate management.15 Among the various
macroeconomic tools for taming the credit boom this left them only with fiscal
policies (Hilbers et al. 2005 at 101).
In addition, the EU is in the process of harmonizing the financial governance
regime across member states as part of the integration of European financial
markets. Notably, the free movement of capital was the last of the “four
13

The
ECB
convergence
reports
are
available
at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html
14
The ECB noted that “in March 2008 the real effective exchange rate for the Polish zloty stood
well above and the real bilateral exchange rate against the euro was somewhat above the
corresponding ten-year historical averages.” However it did caution not to over-interpret the
results in light of Poland’s convergence process. See (ECB 2008)
15
The pros and cons of such monetary policies remain disputed in good times as they undermine
competitiveness and tend to be recessionary. In the event of a crisis they come under attack and
once abandoned lead to an even deeper fall. Nonetheless, floating rates have their own perils in
times of crisis especially when households and companies have borrowed in foreign currencies. I
am grateful to Mario Nuti for pointing this out. This paper does not seek to resolve this debate.
Instead, its goal is to point to the governance implications of alternative exchange rate regimes.
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freedoms” tackled by the EU. After creating the conditions for the free flow of
goods, persons, and (most) services, serious attempts to harmonize financial
market regulation were made only with the adoption of the Financial Services
Action Plan in 1999. The regime that evolved in the subsequent years became
part of the Acquis Communautaire the new member states had to comply with
prior to being accepted as new member states. No serious attempts were made to
modify the impact of this regime on the new member states notwithstanding the
fact that their financial systems were still in the early stages of transformation
and nowhere close to the mature financial systems of old member states at the
time they conceded that it was time to liberalize.
The EU governance regime for credit institutions has strong parallels in the
global financial governance regime developed by the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS). However, the Basel Concordat as well as the two Basel Accords
(I & II) are ‘soft law’ and as such not legally binding. In contrast, a EU directive
requires member states to transpose the directive into national law. The key
governance principles for finance in the EU are home country regulator; bilateral
coordination among home and host country regulators under the leadership of
the home country regulator; and multilateral coordination within a three level
system within the EU.16 Attempts to vest the ECB with centralized regulatory
powers over finance or to create an alternative EU wide regulator have met with
stiff resistance by member states, as well as from their respective financial

16

Most of these principles are reflected in DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of
the business of credit institutions (recast), 30 June 2006, OJ L 177/1 and DIRECTIVE 2006/49/EC
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 2006 on the capital
adequacy of investment f irms and credit institutions (recast), 30 June 2006, OJ L 177/201.
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industries. Therefore, a coordinative governance regime, the so-called
“Lamfalussy Process”, which originally been developed for the governance of
securities markets (Lamfalussy 2001), was extended to credit institutions (Vander
Stichele 2008).
The basic idea of this process named after the chair of the “Committee of
Wise Men” that authored the report is that EU directives (level 1) set forth the
general framework for financial market governance. The implementation and
enforcement of the directives by domestic legislatures and regulators shall be
guided by complementary guidelines developed by two committees. At level 2,
the European Banking Committee, ane body run by the European Commission,
shall facilitate the implementation of directives by addressing political issues as
well as design problems. At level 3, the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors (CEBS) brings together regulators from the member states involved
in the regulation of banks. CEBS is charged with providing technical advice and
ensuring the consistent implementation of the directive by dispersed national
regulators. In addition to collecting information, conducing peer review and
involving the financial industry through consultation processes, CEBS also
functions as mediator in disputes between home and host country regulator
(Vander Stichele 2008).
The complexity of the process and the sheer size of the new committees (51
regulators from 27 countries are currently represented in CEBS) as well as the
lack of actual enforcement powers leaves key decision-making in the hands of
domestic regulators: the regulator in the jurisdiction where a credit institution
has been authorized (licensed). A bank wishing to establish a branch in another
EU member state can do so by simply notifying the regulatory authorities of that
19

country. The same applies if the same bank wishes to offer financial services in
another member state without channeling them either through a branch or a
subsidiary, thus facilitating direct cross-border lending. This European passport
system was designed to promote financial market integration by reducing
regulatory costs for transnational financial intermediaries within the common
market. In contrast, for a separately incorporated entity, i.e. a subsidiary, special
authorization is still required.
The distinction between branches and subsidiaries seems to suggest that
domestic regulators maintain full regulatory authorities over credit institutions
incorporated and licensed within their territory irrespective of their ownership
structure.17 In other words, the fact that 65 to 98 percent of bank assets in CEE
countries are foreign owned should not matter much, as by far the majority of
these banks are fully (domestically) incorporated subsidiaries rather than branch
offices. This contrasts with the rest of the EU, where foreign branches rather than
foreign owned subsidiaries have been much more common. However, in practice
the distinction between branches and subsidiaries has become blurred. Two
factors account for this. First, banks with EU wide or global operations treat
subsidiaries increasingly as branch offices. They have morphed into vertically
integrated financial groups with centralized strategies implemented throughout
the group in a manner that is oblivious of national borders and formal
differences between branch offices and subsidiaries (ECB 2005). The latter
remain relevant mostly for accounting and tax purposes. The corollary to the
17

Legally speaking, subsidiaries are independent legal entities. They are incorporated in their
own home jurisdiction and as such subject to banking regulations of that jurisdiction. In contrast,
branches are not legal entities that are independent of their parent companies, but a branch of a
foreign banks and therefore subject to the legal and regulatory jurisdiction of the parent
company.
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changing industry practice has been the consolidation of regulation for financial
groups operating in more than one country.18 Relevant EU directives allocate
regulatory oversight over subsidiaries of EU parent credit institutions and
financial holdings to the home regulator of the parent. This “consolidated
supervision” entails the “coordination of the gathering and dissemination of
relevant or essential information” as well as the “planning and coordination of
supervisory activities” for the going concern as well as in emergency situations.19
Home country regulators of the subsidiaries shall consult and coordinate with
host country regulators. This division of labor has been re-enforced by the socalled home-host guidelines adopted by CEBS. Upon consultation with the
finance industry, these guidelines emphasize that in order to reduce regulatory
costs the home country regulators of the subsidiary should seek information not
from the subsidiary or its parent, but from the parent’s home country regulator.
The finance industry has made no secret that it would favor comprehensive
delegation of supervisory powers to the parent’s home country regulator.20
Technically, this has been feasible since the adoption of the credit institutions
directive in 2000, but so far not a single domestic regulator has done so.
However, in light of the dominance of foreign bank ownership of the domestic
banking sector in CEE, which implies that virtually all banks in these countries
are subject to consolidated supervision by the home country regulator of the
parent, the difference between consolidated and delegated supervision is less
pronounced than suggested by the law on the books.
18

See Arts. 129 of Directive 2006/48 op cit at note 16.
Ibid.
20
See comments by the European Banking Federation (FEB) on the home-host-country guidelines
issued by CEBS available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/0d883044-b483-4b45-a1f776b9e36b8b59/Responses-to-CP09.aspx.
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The dominance of foreign banks in CEE countries is a result of privatization
in the 1990s and the opening of the financial service sector to foreign investors in
anticipation of EU membership. The asset share of foreign owned banks in CEE
countries ranges from a low of 36 percent in Slovenia to a high of 98 percent in
Estonia (ECB 2005). Only in Estonia and Latvia (47 percent) is the asset share
below 50 percent. In comparison, in Latin America, the asset share of foreign
owned banks is on average 45 percent. Only New Zealand and Botswana have
financial systems that are dominated by foreign owner to an extent that matches
the countries of CEE. The financial systems of CEE countries thus have been
integrated into multinational financial groups with headquarters located outside
their jurisdiction (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2008). The home country regulators
of the parent banks viewed these developments favorably, as they positively
affected the growth of ‘their’ institutions. Regulators in CEE countries still had at
least nominal regulatory control over subsidiaries and could seek information
about them via the parent’s home country regulator. Indeed, regulators in most
CEE countries have signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with
regulators in the home countries of parent banks that own or control banks
within their jurisdiction. However, they could do little to enforce their ultimate
policy objective, namely to guard the stability of their domestic markets, when
the group switched strategies in response to regulatory constraints they tried to
impose. In particular, they could not prevent parent companies form lending
directly in response to side-step constraints imposed on their subsidiaries by CEE
regulators. In a recent study, researchers at the Austrian Central Bank revealed
that direct lending by the Austrian parent company grew rapidly between 2002
and 2007 amounting to over €36 billion annually in 2007. In countries that joined
22

the EU in 2004 direct lending by Austrian parent banks grew by an annual rate of
20 percent on average and in Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007 by 50
percent. As it turns out, most of the borrowers in CEE countries were leasing
companies affiliated with the same group. The critical difference is that as leasing
companies rather than banks they escaped regulations CEE countries sought to
impose on their domestic banks to country the effects of an accelerating credit
boom.21 In other words, the group had found an easy mechanism to arbitrage
around regulatory constraints. For countries in the region, direct lending came at
the additional risk of foreign currency exposure: 85.4 percent of these direct loans
were granted in foreign currency (ONB 2009). While euro-denominated loans
dominated direct lending, the Swiss franc became increasingly common in
Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia.
The combination of financial liberalization within the EU, the dominance of
financial groups from other EU member states, and the emphasis on reducing
regulatory costs for these groups by consolidating regulatory oversight in the
hands of the home country regulator, implies that CEE countries have effectively
abdicated the governance of their domestic financial markets. Undoubtedly, the
integration of CEE banks into multinational banking groups has also benefited
these countries. Reforming the financial sector in the post socialist countries
proved difficult in all countries and the influx of foreign capital and expertise
was widely regarded as critical for their speedy transformation. Moreover,
foreign bank ownership shielded banks against downturns in their domestic
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See (ONB 2009): “… the share of recipient intra-group FIs increased from 65% to more than 70%
of total direct credit to FIs. These growth rates are inter alia due to the growing importance of
leasing firms affiliated with Austrian firms.”
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economy. Empirical analysis of the lending practice of multinational financial
groups suggests that they tend to cross-subsidize subsidiaries in countries facing
a temporary downturn (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2008). In fact, this countercyclical cross-subsidization has helped many banks in the region weather the
first impact of the global crisis. Yet, the study also suggests that the same intragroup dynamics that operate in a counter-cyclical fashion when the locus of
downturn is the economy in which the subsidiary is located, turns pro-cyclical
when the downturn affects the parent’s home economy. Thus, the price for
insurance against purely local economic troubles is exposure to problems that
originate with the parent company or its home market. The global crisis has
revealed that this price can be substantial – in the last quarter of 2008 alone US$
57 billion left the region.22

IV. Wither Financial Governance in CEE?

The policy choices made by countries in the region have effectively
outsourced governance of their financial systems, and most critically among
them, the role of ultimate guardian. This conclusion begs the question: to whom?
There is no simple answer to this question, which is why these countries find
themselves in a governance void. In the end, the most vulnerable countries had
to rely on the IMF while others benefited from the announcement of the EBRD
and the ECB to stand ready for additional aid if need be (see above).23
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Prisoska Nagy, supra note 7.
In this context it should be noted that the ECB does not have lender of last resort powers under
its own charter.
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With respect to crisis prevention in the form of credibility enhancement or
management of the money supply, regulatory oversight was transferred to the
home countries of the dominant banking groups. As a result, the most important
regulators of banks located in CEE countries are those of Austria, Italy,24 Sweden,
and Belgium. The new scope of regulatory jurisdiction of Austria and Sweden
recalls their sphere of influence in long past epochs of empire building. Yet, the
commitment to guard the interests of these countries and protect them against
financial crises has been limited. This raises the question whether the concept of
coordinated governance over financial markets is workable. To be sure, the
European financial governance framework is still a work in progress.
Nonetheless, it is worth asking how this framework will affect countries with
different banking structures in good as well as in bad times. Ultimately, this
requires an investigation into the interests and purposes the governance regime
shall serve. The relevant EU directives skirt the issue by assuming that if all
credit institutions complied with the standards established therein, and all
domestic regulators made sure that they did, financial markets should operate
and savings should be protected.25 In this conceptualization there is no room for
conflicting objectives of prudential regulation and oversight from the perspective
of the home country regulator on one hand, and the host country regulator on
the other whether in normal times, or in a crisis. The EU directives only call for
enhanced cooperation between home and host country regulators in times of
crisis. Yet, such conflicts are easily conceivable. As Herrig (2007) suggests, from
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As a result of Unicredit acquiring the Austrian Bank Creditanstalt.
Recital 5 of Directive 2006/48/EC lists as one of the objectives “to protect savings and to create
equal conditions of competition between these institutions.”
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the host country perspective, the “nightmare scenarios” involve a foreign entity
with a large share of local – i.e. host country – markets “to be systematically
important, while at the same time, being so small relative to the parent group
that it is not regarded as significant to the condition of the parent company”. In
this case, the home country regulator may not see a case for intervention as it is
naturally concerned with the stability of the financial group for its market, not
with the stability of the financial system of countries in which that group
happens to have one or more subsidiaries. For CEE countries the basic features of
this “nightmare scenario” are endemic: Not only are their domestic banking
systems dominated by foreign financial groups, but the banking system is highly
concentrated. As of 2005, the top five banks in key CEE countries had a market
concentration ratio26 ranging from 48 percent in Poland to 99 percent in Estonia
(Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009). As noted above, foreign-owned banks’ asset share
in the same countries is between 36 percent (Slovenia) to 97 percent (Estonia)
(Enoch 2007). Put differently, a few foreign banking groups own most of the
banking sector in a given CEE countries. Even for the largest country among the
new member states, Poland, the importance of foreign owned banks to the
domestic economy is far greater than the importance of Polish subsidiaries to the
portfolio of the foreign parent company (Bednarski and Starnowski 2007). In a
small country like Croatia, Austrian banks controlled 60 percent of the banking
sector as of 2007 (Gardor 2008). This translates into 14.7 percent of total Austrian
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Calculated as the fraction of assets of the total banking system’s assets held by the five largest
domestic and foreign banks per country. See (Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009). The ECB confirms a
high concentration ratio in these countries. See (ECB 2005).
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banking assets.27 This is not trivial; and indeed Croatia features prominently in
the annual report of the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) after the
Czech Republic and Romania as one of the three “main countries” among all
countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in which Austrian
banks hold assets. Notably, the ranking employed by the Austrian FMA is by
asset value, and not by the systemic effect on the host country of strategies
designed and implemented by Austrian parent companies. It clearly reflects the
perspective the home country regulator will bring to its role as consolidated
regulator. Indeed, the presentation auf Austrian bank exposure in CEE both in
the annual report of the FMA and the Financial Stability Report of Austria’s
Central Bank (Österreichische Nationalbank, ONB) is illuminating. For the FMA,
CEE features primarily as a place of expansion and a profit center:
“The region of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) became
even more important to Austria’s banks in 2008. The aggregate balance sheet
total, following some restructuring, grew by close to 30% during the third
quarter of 2008 compared with the same period of 2007 to approximately €272
billion, whilst the result for the period rose by a disproportionately high amount,
up by around 47 % to close to €3.45 billion” (FMA 2008).
The ONB reported that the ‘exposure’ of Austrian banks in the region has had
negative repercussions for the Austrian banking sector during the crisis, but
downplayed the likely effect on the Austrian financial system as “the Austrian
financial intermediaries are regionally diversified, a factor that reduces the risk
of country specific or sub-regional clustering”.28 Whether the countries at the
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According to FMA(2008), total assets of Austria’s financial markets amount to € 1069.3 billion,
44.7 percent of which is held by banks (Table 3). Thus, total assets of the Austrian banking sector
in 2008 amounted to € 478 billion FMA (2008) Table 6 and accompanying text. €32.26 billion in
Croatian bank assets held by Austrian banks.
28
See (ONB 2009) at 46 (translation by author).
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receiving end of Austrian banks’ expansion strategies are similarly diversified is
of no concern.
In sum, the focus of home country regulators is on their domestic banks and
their domestic financial system. Yet, in the event of a crisis – whatever its cause -someone must assume the role of ultimate guardian for the sake of people living
in those countries, but also lest a small country or remote region might threaten
the European or the global system.29 In the capital exporting countries of Europe
and elsewhere, home country governments have stepped in aggressively for the
benefit of their own, national, systems. They have left multilaterals to deal with
those countries that served as capital importers during good times. Thus, the
ONB reassured readers of its financial stability report in June 2009 that “in light
of recent rescue measure by the IMF and the EU Commission, extreme scenarios
have become much less likely” (ONB 2009).
This is good news for everyone, including the people of the CEE countries.
However, it also goes to show that countries that have been subjected to
unconstrained cross-border capital flows and, as a result, have lost the ability to
rescue themselves, must depend on the IMF and other multilateral organizations
to perform the role of ultimate guardian once the risks inherent in such a strategy
materialize. The IMF’s governance structure with its peculiar voting system
means that most countries on the recipient side of IMF rescue packages have
little influence on the design of these policies. The ten CEE countries that recently
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This threat has been clearly voiced by the Erik Berglöf, the EBRD’s chief economist, who wrote
on the EBRD blog in May 2009 that not only do foreign banks affect CEE countries, but CEE
countries can invoke policies that might adversely affect the banks located in other EU member
states: “…Eastern European governments can also damage the international bank groups by
preventing them from transferring profits or adjusting their exposures. The public pressures to
interfere are great.” Available at www.ebrdblog.com (7 May 2009).
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joined the EU, for example, jointly hold 2.75 percent of voting rights.30 At the
EBRD they control 5 percent.31
The countries that had experienced the East Asian financial crisis learned
that lesson ten years ago. They did not like the policies imposed by IMF
conditionalities, which let them to experiment with their own insurance devices.
First, some closed their borders to free capital flows – as Malaysia did, but only
temporarily (Jomo 2006). CEE countries are prevented from exercising this
option by treaty obligations, which prohibit restrictions on cross-border capital
flows within the EU. Alternatively, countries can make provisions for ‘rainy
days’ by ensuring that they will have sufficient resources to conduct their own
rescue should the occasion arise again. Indeed, China32, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
South Korea and Singapore doubled their stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves
in the years following the East Asian financial crisis – and with over US$ 800
billion collectively controlled 38 percent of global reserves by the end of 2002
(Aizenman and Marion 2003). This option presupposes a strong export base for
earning foreign currency and therefore is not available to all countries. Neither is
it necessarily desirable as global imbalances on the current scale create their own
interdependencies, if not dependencies. As China and the Gulf states have come
to realize the value of the accumulated reserves they accumulated hinges on the
value of the US dollar.
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Own
calculation
based
on
information
on
voting
rights
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm
31
Whereas at the IMF voting rights are determined by the size of the economy at the date of entry
(with some adjustments made over time), the Basic Document of the EBRD provides that voting
rights are determined by the number of subscribed shares in the capital stock of the bank (Art.
29). Calculations are based on subscription levels published on the EBRD web site.
32
China did not suffer from the East Asian financial crisis as it still had capital controls in place.
However, it responded to the lessons learnt from observing its neighbors.
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To countries in CEE membership in the European Union offers far better
representation than membership in the IMF, although CEE countries could
hardly muster a veto much less determine the outcome of new regulatory
proposals. Not surprisingly, the latest reform proposals for the EU appear to reenforce the bias in favor of home country regulation. The key policy reform
recommended by the De Larosière report (De Larosière 2008) is the system of
“colleges of supervisors” for multinational financial groups comprising of
regulators from different countries in which the group operates. Critically, the
College is chaired by the home country regulator of that group. As of now it
remains unclear how this regimes shall operate in practice.
Do countries in CEE have other options? Two come to mind. One is to push
for a central regulator for the entire European Union that replaces national
regulators for all financial groups with cross-border operations. This could be the
ECB or a similar entity. While countries from CEE almost certainly will be
disadvantaged vis-à-vis foreign banking groups that are likely to ensure that
their interests will be heard by a EU wide regulator, this would still be superior
to relying on the home country regulator of a financial group that is more
concerned about the health of the group than the stability of a another country’s
financial system. In fact, the history of the DG Competition or the ECG does not
suggest that these bodies have captured by powerful industry. However, for
political reasons, the establishment of a central financial regulator is unlikely as
the UK is likely to veto any such measure.33
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Adam Cohen and Alistair Macdonald, “EU Plan for New Market Watchdog Rattles UK”, The
Wallstreet Journal, 18 June 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com.
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Another option is to reassert domestic regulatory powers and to supplement
the EU regime with national regulation oversight. The US can serve as an
example for such a strategy. First, until recently states exerted regulatory
oversight over subsidiaries of nationally authorized banks that operated on their
territory. In fact, some argue that the dismantling of this co-regulatory regime by
federal agencies, which was backed by the courts, contributed to the regulatory
failure in the subprime mortgage area (Kim 2009). Second, after the events of 11
September 2001, which rose the specter of further attacks on systemically
important organizations in the United States, the Federal Reserve issued a
guideline declaring that every large complex banking organizations whose
operations had a substantial effect on the US market (defined as controlling at
least 5 percent of a relevant market) would be subject to US regulatory oversight
irrespective of its country of origin (Lichtenstein 2005). The announcement of this
effect-based regulation is inconsistent with the principle of home country
regulator as set forth in the Basel agreements, but this did not deter the US – and
dit not have, since the Basel Concordat it soft-law and as such not binding.
Countries in CEE would find themselves in a greater bind when considering
effect-based jurisdiction, because unlike the Basel principles, EU law has
established the principle home country regulator as a legally binding principle.
However, the Treaty on the EU does give countries some discretion for
safeguarding its own financial system in the public policy exemption stipulated
in the EU Treaty.34 To be sure, the European Court of Justice has narrowed the
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Art. 58 (1)(b) provides that member states have the right “to take all requisite measures to
prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and
the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration
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scope of the public policy exception over time, especially in the area of free
movement of legal persons and free movement of capital, where many countries
maintained restrictions.35 Still, the experience of the global financial crisis might
give governments more leeway in making a public policy case. Moreover, EU
directives in the area of financial services acknowledge the interest of home
countries to protect consumers in their markets against risk, by subjecting
financial contracts, including life insurance contracts, to the jurisdiction of the
country where these transactions were entered into even when they otherwise
adhere to the principle of home country regulation.36 A critical issue will be to
define an appropriate trigger for asserting effect-based domestic jurisdiction.
The suggestion to strengthen national regulatory control over financial
intermediaries might appear as a major set back to globalization and financial
integration aspirations. Indeed, the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a
lobby group of major global bankers has already raised the flag of protectionism
in response to regulatory reforms initiated in many countries in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis (IIF 2009). Yet, as long as a regional or global system
does not adequately address the risk of countries that are on the receiving side of
capital flows, nor provides for ultimate guardian functions other than in an ad
hoc fashion by organizations whose own resources depend on the capital
of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take
measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security.” (emphasis added)
35
Examples include the freedom to incorporate a company in a jurisdiction of choice (see the case
law by the European Court of Justice on Centros (Case C-212/97), Überseering (Case C-208/00)
and Inspire Art (Case C-167/01) and most recently Cartesio (Case C-210/06) as well as a series of
decisions on golden shares and other restrictions of foreign direct investment in sensitive
industry sectors. For a critical analysis of the golden share decisions, see (Camara 2002).
36
See, for example DIRECTIVE 2002/83/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance OJ L 345/1 of 19 December 2002. See
Art. 10 (home country regulation) as well as 32 (law applicable to contracts). Note, however, that
the objective of consumer protection is too narrow for the potential systemic risk of financial
services.
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exporting countries, national responses will remain the default option. Those EU
member states that bailed out their own financial systems in the midst of the
crisis, including those that had adopted the common currency, have seen this
clearly and have acted accordingly. EU institutions have responded by
scrutinizing their measures under EU competition law and restrictions on state
aid.37 Importantly, EU institutions were unable to prevent countries from
adopting national rescue packages in the first place or to offer their own rescue
instead.38 As a matter of principle, there is no reason why other EU member
states should not be allowed to do the same preemptively, if failure to act will
expose them to the risk of a governance void. The alternative to mutually agreed
standards on effect-based regulation is likely to be preemptive unilateral
measures taken by countries that find themselves exposed to risk. This could
easily translate into a race to impose capital controls, which would undo much of
what has been achieved with regards to financial market integration. And lastly,
effect-based regulation may operate as a constraint on the size of operations any
global bank will control in a given market, which would diversify the exposure
of any country to a single banking group.
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The DG Competition has adopted a temporary framework for scrutinizing state aid in the
context of the global financial crisis, which eases the restrictions placed on such measures. For
details and for measures the DG has taken with regards to member state actions (mostly
decisions not to intervene), see
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/tackling_economic_crisis.html.
38
This was true even for countries that had adopted the euro. While the ECB adopted a range of
measures to boost liquidity, unlike the Fed it does no have the power to lend directly to financial
intermediaries, i.e. to engage in specific rescue operations.
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IV.

Concluding Comments: Implications for the Global Governance of
Finance

The financial crises that swept emerging financial markets in the 1990s and
the early 2000s left the impression that the world could and should be divided
into two camps: countries with good institutions capable of participating in an
increasingly globalized financial system on one hand, and countries with bad
institutions that participated at their own peril, if at all, on the other. The global
crisis that has engulfed members of both camps suggests a different divide:
countries that are capable of bailing out themselves, and those that are not. This
difference implies that the two groups of countries have different demands on
the governance regime for global finance. For countries with bail out capacity
and sufficient political clout to act independently irrespective of existing regional
or international commitments, a global regime serves two critical purposes: it
enables financial intermediaries it houses to expand in good times, and facilitates
cross-border workouts for them in bad times. In comparison, countries that have
either de jure or de facto abdicated their role as ultimate guardian for their
financial system have greater needs for risk management in good times to reduce
the probability of a crisis. They also external help to bail out their financial
system in the event of a crisis.
The global governance regime for financial markets as it existed prior to the
crisis played a critical role as enabler for global expansion strategies of financial
groups – most of which are located in countries with ultimate guardianship
capabilities. It has been less effective in providing cross-border workouts –
something that not surprisingly has become a major focus of future reforms. The
34

IMF has repeatedly performed the role of ultimate guardian to countries that
lacked this capacity. In that sense, there already exists a workout regime for
afflicted financial systems. Whether it served the interest of those countries is
much disputed by countries around the world that have been subjected to IMF
policies. But it is probably beyond dispute that the IMF has used its influence in
countries it helped rescue at least in part to re-enforce the first strategy, namely
to foster the global expansion of financial groups by streamlining institutional
and regulatory conditions around the world. Moreover, the regime fell short of
adequate risk management with respect to countries that were unable to protect
themselves against financial crises. Instead, financial liberalization was endorsed
without much concern for the lack of an appropriate global governance regime
that could cope major financial crises.
Reform proposals currently under discussion do not depart from this trend.
Most address regulatory standards, that is, the credibility problem of financial
governance, as well as post-crisis workouts for financial intermediaries. In
addition, the G20 has committed to strengthen the IMF and G20 countries have
collectively agreed to commit US $850 billion to ensure that capital will keep
flowing to emerging markets and developing countries – that is, to ensure that
the IMF has the capacity to bail them out if needed. Moreover, the IMF is
signaling a renewed willingness to improve its own governance structure to
reclaim the legitimacy it has lost. However, neither the G20 nor the IMF have
put much efforts into designing a regime that would address the vulnerability of
countries and financial systems that have lost control over the supply side of
money. That would require questioning a key assumption on which the current
regime rests, namely that unconstrained capital flows are an unmitigated good.
35
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